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(PPDB) project, a major survey of party organizations in parliamentary and 
semi-presidential democracies. The project’s first round of data covers 122 
parties in 19 countries. In this paper we describe the scope of the 
database, then investigate what it tells us about contemporary party 
organization in these countries, focussing on parties’ resources, structures 
and internal decision-making. We examine organizational patterns by 
country and party family, and where possible we make temporal 
comparisons with older datasets. Our analyses suggest a remarkable 
coexistence of uniformity and diversity. In terms of the major 
organizational resources on which parties can draw, such as members, 
staff and finance, the new evidence largely confirms the continuation of 
trends identified in previous research: i.e., declining membership, but 
enhanced financial resources and more paid staff. We also find remarkable 
uniformity regarding the core architecture of party organizations. At the 
same time, however, we find substantial variation between countries and 
party families in terms of their internal processes, with particular regard to 
how internally democratic they are, and in the forms that this 
democratization takes. 
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Introduction
1
 
How do parties organize, and how much do parties’ organizational differences matter? The aim 
of the Political Party Database Project (PPDB) is to provide systematic answers to the first 
question so that we can better answer the second one, the crucial ‘so what?’ question about party 
organizational variations. Other questions we investigate are to what extent, and why, do parties 
retain certain structural features despite changes in their competitive environments? For instance, 
are some traditional organizational features outmoded, such as party conferences and party 
membership?  If so, these could be nothing more than quaint relics, or they could be contributing 
to something other than their nominal purpose. To use Bagehot’s terminology (1963/1867), it is 
possible that parties’ extra-parliamentary organizations have become the “dignified” elements of 
party constitutions, with the real work of party politics being done by the “efficient” parts of the 
organization, be these the professionalized party staffs or the party officeholders.  Bagehot wrote 
that the dignified elements were theatrical and often old elements which helped “to excite and 
preserve the reverence of the population” (61); similarly, some party practices might be remnants 
of earlier conditions, but which nevertheless still contribute to the legitimacy of party 
government.   
Generating legitimacy is not a small thing, as Bagehot himself noted, so if organizations 
play that role, this is important, but we would still want to know whether parties retain these 
institutions because they continue to contribute in other ways.  We do not expect to find simple 
or universal answers to any of these questions, but we do expect to gain traction in answering 
them by using systematic data to test posited relationships. This conviction has inspired the 
establishment of the PPDB.  In the remainder of this article we introduce this database, and 
present some of our initial findings regarding the state of contemporary party organizations in 19 
democracies. 
 
I. The Long Tradition of Comparative Party Scholarship: Concepts, Categories and Data   
The comparative study of political parties’ extra-legislative organizations and activities is more 
than 150 years old, having arisen alongside the emergence of electoral politics. In the middle 
third of the 20
th
 century, the comparative study of political parties was stimulated and re-defined 
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by authors who ambitiously constructed new categories and new causal theories to explain 
organizational differences between political parties in multiple democracies, and to explain 
changes over time (including Neumann 1954; Duverger 1954; Kirchheimer 1966 and many 
more). More recent contributors continued to develop this approach (cf. Ware 1987; von Beyme 
1985; Panebianco 1988). A common feature of these multi-country studies is their reliance on 
thick description to buttress their arguments. Some of their most enduring contributions are now-
familiar labels (e.g., mass, catch-all, electoral professional, etc.). Much of the theoretical 
speculation in these classic studies treats parties and party organizations as dependent variables, 
explaining how contemporary parties bear the marks of their origins, and how organizational 
differences reflect institutional contexts and ideological (party family) similarities.  
Echoing general trends in political science, recent decades have witnessed the rise of 
more systematic and more quantitative studies of political parties’ organizations and activities 
outside the legislative arena. Much of this research relies on party statutes and documents for 
evidence about party structures, sometimes combined with expert judgments about how parties 
actually work. One notable investigation that combined both approaches was Kenneth Janda’s 
pioneering study of party organization and practices in 53 countries (1980). Janda and his 
colleague Robert Harmel later proposed a different framework for collecting and interpreting 
data about party organizational change, one aimed squarely at understanding practices in 
democratic regimes (1994). The 1980s also brought the start of another ambitious effort to gather 
cross-party and longitudinal data on party organizational development, what became the 12-
country Party Organizations: a Data Handbook on Party Organizations in Western 
Democracies, 1960-90 (Katz and Mair 1992). This effort focused on what the editors dubbed the 
“official story” approach, primarily reporting published data and formal rules.  
 
II. Introducing the PPDB
2
 
The PPDB project falls squarely within this tradition of evidence-driven approaches to the 
comparative study of political parties. It deliberately builds on and extends past efforts, while 
aiming to complement, not duplicate, other contemporary efforts to gather data on elections and 
representation. Thus, in some cases it replicates questions that have been used in earlier studies, 
making it easier to use some of PPDB’s snapshot data for longitudinal comparisons.  
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In forming what was essentially a data-gathering collaborative endeavour, members of 
this project agreed to pool their efforts and standardize variables in order to maximize the utility 
of our individual data gathering efforts. In building our initial team, we deliberately sought out 
members with varied theoretical and methodological approaches to the study of political parties. 
This diversity is reflected in the data that we chose to gather. (A full list of those involved in this 
data collection effort is included in Appendix 1.)    
We decided early on to focus on the “official story”, in order to facilitate future 
replication; this decision also constrained our choice of variables.
3
 We also prioritized gathering 
data that would be useful for studying parties and their resources as independent variables – in 
other words, that would help us answer the questions of why and how organizational variations 
matter.   
The PPDB Round 1 data provides information on 122 parties in 19 countries4 during the 
2010-2014 period.  These parties include most or all of the parties represented in the lower 
houses of the respective national parliaments at that time, with the exception of France, for 
which we have information on only the two parties with the largest number of legislative seats. 
The database includes over 300 variables that collectively describe some of the most important 
aspects of party structures and practices. For some parties and some variables we have readings 
for more than one year; for most, however, we have just one data point. We have deliberately 
included most countries included in the Katz/Mair Data Handbook to maximize the value of the 
data. To these we have added (mostly) parliamentary regimes which differ from the original in 
many theoretically relevant ways. For instance, they have different electoral systems, different 
electoral thresholds, use both federal and unitary structures, have varied lengths of democratic 
experience, varied population sizes, and disparate levels of state funding for political parties. In 
short, this data set offers multiple opportunities to test questions about how institutional settings 
can affect the ways that parties organize, and about when and how this matters.   
The conceptual roadmap that guided our choice of indicators was the view that party 
organizations can usefully be described in terms of their structures, their resources, and their 
representative strategies. We further subdivided each of these dimensions with the aim of 
answering specific questions. For instance, a recurring question for scholars is the extent to 
which parties should be viewed as unitary actors. In order to better answer this question, we 
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incorporated indicators derived from four structural sub-dimensions which illuminate the formal 
location of decision-making within the party, and at what level (if at all) these decisions are 
enforced (leadership autonomy, centralization, coordination, and territorial dispersion). 
Similarly, we sub-divided the resource dimension into three various categories of resource 
(including money, members and staff) in order to better identify dependency relationships and 
resource control.  Table 1 shows some of the areas covered, and the specific variables we use to 
measure them.   In a nutshell, we have collected data on party membership, party staff, party 
finance, basic party units, party executive composition, formal links to collateral organizations, 
women’s representation, leadership selection, candidate selection, manifesto construction and 
approval, and intra-party referendums.   Our conceptual foundation helped to ensure that we have 
gathered sufficient data to test the predictions of the many theories of party organizational 
change, including those which posit links between parties’ internal power dynamics and their 
resource bases. 
 
[Table 1 about here] 
 
III. Extra-Parliamentary Parties in Contemporary Democracies: Structural Similarities, 
Resource Differences? 
Taken as a whole, the PPDB provides an extraordinarily detailed current snapshot of extra-
parliamentary parties in both established and newer democracies.  In other publications the many 
authors of this paper will use PPDB data to study the impact and origins of party organizational 
differences. Our aim here is more straightforwardly descriptive: we want to use the PPDB data to 
highlight important similarities between – and key differences across – party organizations in 
established party democracies. In what follows we present key findings, pointing out important 
patterns of practice in terms of resources, structures, and linkages.  
 In this overview, we focus on two main comparisons: across countries, and across 
party families. Previous studies give us mixed messages about what patterns we should expect to 
find. We know that parties are moulded by their social and institutional environments as well as 
by their ideological heritage (Harmel 2002, Harmel and Janda 1994), but when looking at parties 
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from various parliamentary systems we are uncertain about whether ideological leanings (party 
family) will outweigh the effects of country-specific institutions.  Or indeed, we might find 
similarity that crosses both categories.  Major contributions towards the literature on party types 
have drawn attention to organizational contagion across geographic and ideological boundaries, 
identifying a developmental trajectory leading from cadre to mass to catch-all to cartel parties as 
the dominant pattern (Neumann 1956, Duverger 1954; Kirchheimer 1966; Epstein 1968; Katz 
and Mair 1995). These approaches suggest that we should expect our cross-sectional data set to 
show a large degree of similarity in the way parties organize, while ideological or national 
factors should not be very important. With will use our comprehensive cross-national data to test 
how well the idea of a modal party type holds empirically.  
 
IV. Resources: Money, Staff, Members 
We begin by examining three types of resource conventionally associated with organizational 
strength: money, staff and members. All are potentially important resources that can help parties 
to win elections.5  
 
A. Money 
Money is the first – and perhaps most important - resource on which parties rely. In this section 
we review what the PPDB tells us about the incomes of national parties’ head offices. To 
facilitate comparison, Table 2 reports national patterns in four ways: average party income, 
average party income relative to the size of national economy, average income relative to the size 
of the electorate, and the financial dependence of parties on the state (i.e. percentage of income 
from public subsidies). The first of these indicators tells us which countries have the richest and 
poorest parties in absolute terms; inevitably, however, these things can be expected to reflect to a 
considerable extent the relative size and wealth of each country, and indeed, the generosity of the 
state, which is why it is also interesting to examine the other indicators. For parties for which we 
have more than one year’s worth of data (which is most of the dataset), we use the mean score of 
all available measures; for others we are only able to draw on a single year of data. This table 
breaks down the data by country and party family in the form of a Multiple Classification 
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Analysis, which enables us to gauge the relative significance of these two factors as independent 
variables.6 The key statistics to focus on here are the beta coefficients at the bottom of each 
column, which provide a measure of the relative strength of country and party family effects in 
explaining variation in each of these measures.7 
 
[Table 2 about here] 
 
In terms of absolute levels of income, it is plain from the first column in Table 2 that the 
German, French and Spanish parties are much wealthier than those of any other country on 
average, while the Italians also receive well above the overall average of 14.2 million euros per 
year. In saying this, we should take note of the fact that we only have data for the two largest 
parties in France, which probably inflates the country’s position relative to others in this table.8 
The Israeli, Hungarian, Irish and Danish parties feature among the poorest in these terms. When 
we control for the size of the national economy, we see that a rather different pattern emerges, in 
that the Czech, Spanish, Portuguese and Austrian parties enjoy most income relative to GDP, 
while the British and Dutch are poorest. However, if we additionally correct for the number of 
registered electors – the size of the body politic, as it were – we find that the Poles, British and 
Hungarians are the most impecunious, with their parties only attracting 17, 28, and 29 cents per 
registered elector, respectively (see Table 2, column 3). At the other end of the scale, the 
Norwegians and Austrians stand out as being in a league of their own, with the former country's 
parties earning 2.77 euros and the latter’s slightly under 2 euros per elector. Germany, which is 
at the top of the table for the first measure, is only in the middle of the pack when income is 
standardized by the size of the national economy or the number of voters. While countries vary 
widely in the per-voter sums available to their parties, we might reasonably reflect that even two 
or three euros per elector is not such a high price to pay for one’s democracy: arguably, the 
world’s parliamentary democracies get their party politics on the cheap. Finally, the fourth 
column in Table 2 reveals the extraordinary extent to which the parties in contemporary 
democracies have become financially dependent on the state. In 11 of the 18 countries for which 
we have data, the mean dependency ratio is over 50 percent, and in five countries (Hungary, 
Israel, Belgium, Austria and Portugal) it is in the range of three-quarters or more. At the other 
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end of the scale, the UK is a stark outlier, with its parties only deriving an average of 9 percent of 
their income from the state.  
 
What of the different party families? The lower panel of Table 2 reveals a straightforward 
and not particularly surprising story when the data are broken down this way.9 The wealthiest 
parties are the Social Democrats and the Christian Democrats. These well-established party 
families have dominated much of Europe’s post-war history as governing parties. All other party 
families have lower, but relatively similar, average income levels. The ‘big two’ are well above 
the overall mean income for the dataset, while all others are considerably below it. This pattern 
remains broadly true, no matter how you look at it – in raw currency values, relative to national 
income, or per elector. The Social Democrats do best in each of these regards, while the Green 
parties fare poorest. There is relatively little variation around the mean in terms of dependence 
on state funding, except that the small number of far right parties seem especially well served by 
state support. Multiple Classification Analysis suggests that differences between countries 
explain more of the variance in each of these measures of party income than differences between 
party families, in so far as the beta coefficients are always higher for the inter-country variations 
than for the inter-family variations. This is, of course, only indicative evidence: more complex 
multivariate modelling would be required to draw more definitive conclusions. Nevertheless, it 
points to the likelihood that patterns of party funding converge around national models more than 
they do around typical party family models. Furthermore, the fact that both inter-country and 
inter-party family differences are statistically significant across all of these indicators 
undermines the notion that there is any generally ‘typical’ model of party organization.  
 
B. Staff 
One of the most under-researched fields in the study of political parties is that of party 
employees. This is a significant oversight, which leaves us with a deficient understanding of an 
important aspect of party organizational development. This is particularly so since it seems likely 
that payroll staff are more important than ever before. In part this is because modern election 
campaigning and political marketing depend on professional expertise. In addition, it is likely 
that parties have come to rely increasingly on paid professionals in the context of party 
membership decline and ‘de-energization’ around the democratic world see below).  
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What evidence does our database provide about current levels of party staff? In 
investigating this issue, we are reminded of one of the main reasons for the dearth of research 
into party employees: the sheer difficulty of getting the relevant data. For whatever reason, many 
parties tend to be reluctant to provide data on their number of payroll employees. The PPDB also 
suffers from the same reluctance. That said, we believe that we have sufficient information to 
generate a meaningful picture. We have central party staffing data for 15 countries, and 
legislative party staffing data for 12 countries, giving us a total of 60-63 parties for our various 
staffing measures.10 A further complication is that snapshot comparisons of party payroll figures 
could be misleading if the data come from different points in the electoral cycle, because many 
parties hire more staff in election than non-election years. As it happens, most of the PPDB 
staffing data comes from non-election years, with the exception being the parties in Denmark, 
Ireland (for Fine Gael and Fianna Fail) and Portugal. This means that the particular snapshot we 
have can be regarded as largely representative of parties' 'normal' mode of operation in non-
election years.  
[Table 3 about here] 
 
What do we find, then? Table 3 shows that the Spanish and British parties have the most head 
office staff, whether measured in absolute or relative terms.11 We should perhaps be wary of 
taking some of the very low national averages too literally, because they are either based on very 
few cases (e.g, Portugal, Hungary, Israel) or key data are missing for large parties (e.g, the 
Danish Social Democrats). Table 4’s figures on legislative party staff are distorted by an obvious 
outlier – Germany, whose parties appear to employ quite extraordinarily high numbers of 
parliamentary staff. These party staff are in fact formally employees of the state; however, they 
have a number of functions, some of which are party-related, so we think that it is justified to 
regard them as a party resource.12 Excluding the German parties, the average number of 
legislative party employees is just 26.2, which is perhaps a more generally representative figure 
of the database countries as a whole. Of perhaps as much interest as the absolute numbers is the 
comparison between the first and third columns of Table 3. This shows that parties in countries 
such as Hungary, Portugal, Israel and Ireland apparently have more of their human resources in 
parliaments than in the national headquarters, while parties in other countries (including Spain, 
UK and the Czech Republic) have opposite distributions of staff resources. 
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 Of course, the number of staff that parties employ to assist their MPs might reasonably be 
expected to reflect the number of legislators that they return to parliament, so it is also useful to 
control for the size of parliamentary parties in assessing staffing establishments. Hence, Table 3 
also reports the mean number of legislative employees per MP that parties maintain in each 
country. Overall, this produces a rather modest figure: the German parties are, of course, 
substantially higher than any others, being able to call on the support of nearly 7 staff members 
for each MP, but in most other the countries the norm is only about 1 or 2. By a similar logic, 
when evaluating the number of central party staff as a resource it is interesting to control for the 
numbers of party members whom they might need to serve. This shows relatively little variation 
across country, there being only slightly more than 1 employee for every thousand members 
across the dataset as a whole; Hungary would appear to enjoy the highest central staff/member 
ratio, but this is based on a single case for which we have data, so should be regarded with great 
caution. 
What of patterns by party family? The lower panel of Table 3 reports these, and shows a 
pattern that is broadly familiar from the analysis of financial data, with the Christian 
Democratic/Conservative and Social Democratic families predominating in terms of absolute 
staffing establishments. That said, the Greens and Left Socialists employ high quantities of staff 
relative to their individual memberships and numbers of MPs. Again, we should note that the 
beta coefficients generally suggest stronger country effects than party family effects in respect of 
party staffing. 
 
C. Parties and members 
The literature on party members has grown considerably over the past two decades, seemingly in 
inverse relationship to the numbers of the subject under investigation (including most recently 
Faucher 2015, Scarrow 2015, and van Haute and Gauja 2015).  The evidence on the decline of 
party membership numbers across the democratic world is overwhelming (van Biezen, Mair and 
Poguntke 2012). In Table 4, we update the story of individual party membership trends by 
reporting the aggregate membership across all parties for each country, national 
membership/electorate (ME) ratios, and MCA results.  
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The downward trend which has so often been observed remains apparent in our data. 
There are 15 PPDB countries for which we can trace changes over time. The mean aggregate 
membership figure for these countries was 886,850 per country at the start of the time-series in 
the 1980s (1990s in the East European cases); by the mid-to-late 2000s when van Biezen et al. 
(2012) reported their figures the average had fallen to 633,425 for the same countries; and in the 
PPDB data for the years 2011-2014, it has dropped to 549,360. Indeed, if we include the four 
further countries that are part of the PPDB but were not in the van Biezen et al. study (Australia, 
Canada, France and Israel), the national average falls to just 446,164. Not surprisingly, the 
picture is similar even after controlling for the size of electorates; the average 
membership/electorate ratio (ME) for the original 15 countries was 7.50 in the early 1980s (or 
1990 in the case of Hungary), but had declined to 4.14 by the mid-2000s. The PPDB shows that 
it now stands at 3.48 (or 3.13 including Australia, Canada, France and Israel). The only country 
in which the ME ratio has not declined in recent years is Ireland, which appears to have 
experienced a modest increase (from 2.03 to 2.16) in the 5 years following 2008. 
 
[Table 4 about here] 
 
What is the picture if we break down the analysis by party family? Table 4 sheds some light on 
this question. The pattern revealed is familiar: as usual, the Social Democrats and Christian 
Democrats have the largest average memberships of any party family, and the highest average 
ME ratios. Some of the smaller parties (especially on the Far Right) have surprisingly high ME 
ratios where they are successful, but this is only in a limited number of countries. In summary, 
then, the Christian Democrats, Conservatives and Social Democrats continue to have the highest 
ratios of members to electors in their countries. Once again, the beta coefficients in Table 4 
suggest greater variation by country than by party family. 
 
To summarise: in examining the organizational resources at the disposal of the 122 parties in our 
database, we have found that ME ratios continue to fall in almost all the PPDB countries, such 
that little more than 3 percent voters now join political parties in these disparate states; that 
German, Spanish and French parties seem to be the richest in terms of funding and staff; that 
parties in the majority of these democracies now rely on state subsidies for the majority of their 
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income; and that party staffing levels are relatively modest in most countries, although 
extraordinarily high in Germany. Moreover, such variations as we find across these measures of 
organizational resources are better explained by country rather than party family. 
 
V. Structures:  Surprising Uniformity?  
Extra-parliamentary organizations first developed in late 19
th
 and early 20
th
 centuries, stimulated 
by the organizational efforts of opposition parties, including Socialists and workers in Germany, 
Austria and the UK, Liberals in the UK, farmers’ parties in Scandinavia, and religious parties in 
Belgium and the Netherlands. These parties had widely differing aims, but many of them 
adopted very similar organizational structures, operating as “subscriber democracies”.  In other 
words, they were clubs with statutes, membership procedures and annual dues, local branches, 
annual or biennial national congresses as the nominally highest party organ, and smaller 
executive committees holding broad authority between meetings of the national conference 
(Morris 2000; Scarrow 2015: ch. 2.).  
By the middle of the twentieth century, parties in most parliamentary democracies had 
adopted some variant of the subscriber democracy model of party organization. Of course, 
formal structures may not tell us much about actual distributions of influence within political 
parties. Nevertheless, the adoption and spread of the individual member/congress model seems to 
signal acceptance of the idea of parties as micro-polities, and recognition that permanent party 
organization can be useful for policy implementation and for electoral mobilisation.   
How much particular party organizations actually contribute to legitimacy, or help 
electoral mobilisation, are empirical questions. In regards to both legitimacy and mobilisation we 
would expect that some arrangements are more effective than others, and that the impact of 
similar structures may vary under different circumstances. As a result, even if many parties 
adhere to a basically similar model, we would expect to find cross-party organizational variation, 
not least because parties have incentives to engage in organizational experimentation. For 
instance, a string of parties have made headlines in recent years by claiming that they are going 
to do politics in a new way, and that they therefore have novel party structures and 
organizational practices. (These include the poetically named “liquid democracy” of the German 
Pirates Party, and the “Operating System” software of the Italian Five Star Movement.) If 
organizational novelty is a voter winner, we would expect such experimentation to flourish. 
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Partly confounding this prediction is one striking finding from our survey of 
contemporary party organizations in parliamentary democracies: the sheer uniformity in basic 
organizational structures and rules. Both old and new parties adhere to a subscriber democracy 
organizational model in which dues-paying members are the polis for most or all important 
decisions, and in which the party conference is (formally) the party’s highest organ.   
A. Representative Assemblies 
Almost all the party statutes establish representative structures for internal decision-
making, with the party congress at the formal apex. The following section says more about the 
formal distribution of power among party levels; for now, what we want to emphasize is that the 
member/congress template still plays a prominent role in party claims to be internally 
democratic. Most party statutes stipulate that the party congresses will meet regularly, with 75 
percent of parties requiring these assemblies to be held more than once every three years. Across 
party families there is modest variation in the frequency with which these need to be held. Most 
notably, three quarters of Green Parties require their congress to meet at least annually. In 
contrast, the “old left” Left Socialists tend to set looser requirements, with 40 percent stipulating 
that party congresses must be held only once every 4 or 5 years. 
Most parties have a smaller executive committee heading their extra-parliamentary 
organizations. Because these bodies have different names across parties, we asked our 
respondents to tell us about the highest executive body recognized in the party statutes. In other 
words, we are not interested in cabinet meetings or informal meetings between party leaders and 
their trusted advisors. As a rough rule of thumb, we suggest that the smaller these bodies are, the 
more likely it is that they are conducting some of the real business of leading the party. About 
half the parties have executive committees with 20 or fewer members; these are small enough to 
be effective governing bodies. When we compare this to analyses based on the data documented 
in the Katz/Mair Handbook, we see a remarkable stability in the configuration of the essential 
intra-party bodies. In other words, organizational innovation has been very limited over time 
(Poguntke 2000: ch 6). 
In the majority of parties (56 percent), these executive committees report directly to the 
party congress. Most of the remaining parties have one additional medium-sized committee 
between the party congress and the executive. The incidence of such intermediate-level 
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committees is inversely related to the frequency of the required meetings of party congresses: the 
more committee layers, the greater the time span between required meetings of the party 
congress (r=.259). In terms of the relation between different “faces” of the party within the party 
organs, it is noteworthy that legislators are well-represented in the organs of the extra-
parliamentary parties: in half the parties, at least 20 percent of the party’s executive committee 
are also members of the national legislature. 
 
B. Leadership Powers 
Despite the widespread adherence to the subscriber-democracy organizational model, party 
statutes vary widely in the powers and responsibilities they grant to their party leaders. These 
differences affect both the extent to which leaders’ roles are spelled out in statutes, and the 
specified relationship between the party leader and the extra-parliamentary party.  Among those 
that explicitly address the leader’s role, two-fifths refer to the leader’s position as external 
representative of the party.  Just over a quarter specify that the leader is formally accountable to 
the party congress.  In terms of leaders’ obligations and powers, a fifth of the party statutes give 
the party leader the right to help select his or her deputy, and to summon the party congress, 
while nearly a third give the leader the right to summon the party officials.
13
 More than 90 
percent of the statutes explicitly mention that the party leader could or should attend the party 
congress or party executive. A small number (5 percent) formally give their leaders the right to 
approve or veto coalition agreements; similarly, only 7 percent of the parties give the party 
leader a statutory right to appoint one or more members of the party executive.  
 
The nine items mentioned above can be combined to produce an additive index of leadership 
power. Parties are widely dispersed on this index, approximately following a normal distribution, 
but no party earns the top possible score for leadership autonomy (see Appendix 2 for details).   
As Table 5 shows, on average the parties do not give their leaders so many of these powers, the 
overall mean being 3.29 for the 81 cases for which we are able to generate index scores. The 
score for Italy (7.0) is far higher than for any other country, but this is derived from just one 
party (the Democrats). In fact, only 5 percent of all PPDB cases score as highly as this, so it is 
far from typical. Around three-quarters of parties score between 3 and 5 on the leadership power 
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index, with Spain, Portugal, Canada, Hungary and Belgium achieving the highest averages, and 
Australia, Germany and the Netherlands the lowest. In terms of party families, the Far Right give 
their leaders most formal power and the Left Socialists least, with the other families being fairly 
tightly clustered between these two political antipodes. As usual, however, it is evident from the 
beta coefficients that country effects are far stronger than party family effects in explaining 
variation in this aspect of party organization. 
 
[Table 5 about here] 
 
To be sure, statues do not tell us everything about how parties distribute decision-making 
authority between the party leader, the extra-parliamentary organization, and the parliamentary 
party?  Yet, the correlations in Table 6 point towards an interesting and consistent pattern which 
indicates that formal powers are systematically related to other aspects of parties’ organizational 
life: the larger the party (whether in terms of members, seats held in the legislature or number of 
people sitting on the national executive), the greater the leader’s power. It is also noteworthy that 
leaders’ rights seem to grow the more frequently parties hold congresses. On the face of it, this is 
a counter-intuitive finding, although it might simply be a function of party size, in that larger 
parties can afford to hold more frequent congresses.  
 
[Table 6 about here] 
 
To conclude: the predominant finding of this section is the striking similarity in what might be 
termed the organizational skeletons of the parties. Whereas the previous section showed 
considerable cross-national variation in the distribution of resources, this section shows the 
continued dominance of the subscriber democracy model across established and newer 
democracies, and across party families. This enduring similarity is seldom remarked upon, but 
we find it notable, not least because it has survived several waves of populist challenges over the 
past four decades. Parties that proudly deviate from this basic model, and which claim to pursue 
a new brand of democracy, tend to receive a great deal of attention from journalists and scholars 
alike. In fact, however, few of those parties have gained enough traction to join and stay in 
national legislatures for multiple terms. Those that do remain have tended to change their 
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organizations in ways that make them more similar to the organizations of their older peers. Such 
organizational convergence is undoubtedly encouraged by national regulations and statutes that 
dictate some of the fundamental organizational options for parties and/or voluntary 
organizations. Yet that is not the whole explanation, because in some cases party structures pre-
date the laws, and in any case parties themselves are in a position to alter the regulations if they 
wished to do so. If the organizational convergence is not driven by ideology, perhaps it has been 
driven by the model’s functional utility (cf. Poguntke 1998), and/or by its perceived legitimacy. 
 
VI. Parties as Democratic Linkage 
 
A. Measuring Intra-Party Democracy 
We have seen in the previous section that political parties largely resemble each other when it 
comes to the configuration of their core party bodies. However, when we take a closer look at 
how their organizations provide for linkage to the citizenry, we find remarkable variation.  This 
is at odds with the prevailing narrative in the literature that assumes a succession of dominant 
party types.  
The membership organization of political parties is one of their principal ways of 
generating linkage to society (Poguntke 2000). While adherents of a Schumpeterian view of 
democracy would argue that democracy does not necessarily require democratic linkage through 
parties, others maintain that it is virtually unthinkable except in these terms. Obviously, we 
cannot decide this debate here. However, our data allows us to investigate the empirical realities 
irrespective of normative desirability. We have collected data on a considerable number of 
variables that are related to the democratic quality of political parties’ internal politics. These can 
be combined to create valid measures of intra-party democracy (IPD). For details of the 
construction of these measures see Appendix 3 and von dem Berge & Poguntke (2016). 
As defined here, the benchmark of IPD is that it maximizes the involvement of party 
members in the decisions that are central to a party’s political life, including programme writing, 
and personnel selection and other intra-organizational decision-making.14 From this perspective, 
it seems plausible to argue that the degree of organizational decentralization represents an 
independent component of IPD that should be measured independently of general inclusiveness, 
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a point several scholars have made elsewhere (Hazan and Rahat 2010; Scarrow 2005: 6; von dem 
Berge et al. 2013). However, for the sake of parsimony, in this examination we will focus solely 
on the degree of inclusiveness to measure IPD, because empirically these concepts overlap. For 
instance, a higher degree of decentralization automatically leads to a higher degree of 
inclusiveness because when more party bodies are involved (like the German Land parties or the 
British constituency parties), more members will be involved – even if these are the local party 
leaders and not all the members15  
 
B. Two Variants of Intra-Party Democracy 
In measuring IPD we make a different theoretically-based distinction between assembly-based 
and plebiscitary variants of IPD, constructing separate indices to measure both types of IPD. 
Each of these represents a different approach to discerning the will of the group. Assembly-based 
IPD assigns decision-making to meetings, whose participants debate propositions and then take a 
decision. Plebiscitary IPD separates the stages of debate and decision-making, and places the 
latter stage in the hands of the mass membership via a ballot. Both types may be more or less 
inclusive.  While assembly-based IPD is often associated with decisions made by a meeting of 
party delegates, it also includes decisions made at town-hall type assemblies in which all 
attendees are eligible to debate and vote. We contend that plebiscitary decision-making embodies 
a fundamentally different logic as it provides no way to deliberate and reach compromise. It is 
the politics of ‘either/or’, which arguably gives a lot of power to the leaders (Katz and Mair 
1995: 21), even though it may also be exploited as a leadership-challenging device.  In contrast, 
assembly-based IPD provides opportunities to amend the question and to take repeated rounds of 
voting. What counts for us now is that it follows an inherently different logic (Cross and Katz 
2013).  
Following this logic our assembly-based IPD-index (AIPD) measures the inclusiveness of 
party decision-making based on discussions within party bodies and assemblies, including 
assemblies of all members. It covers the three essential components of intra-party democracy, 
namely programme writing, personnel selection (leaders and candidates) and organizational 
structure (referring to the relative strength of party bodies like congress and executive). A higher 
index score indicates that a more inclusive party body has the final say in this area. 
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Our plebiscitary IPD index (PIPD) measures the degree to which parties allow for non-
assembly decisions on a one member, one vote basis. These decisions are made by the lone party 
member at home on a computer screen, or via the casting of a ballot through the post or a party-
run polling station. It covers only programme-writing and personnel-selection. A higher index 
score means that a party provides more opportunities for ballots on these aspects. The PIPD 
index assigns a positive value to all parties which incorporate such procedures in their rules, even 
if they are optional or apply only in certain situations or are combined with assembly-based 
procedures. It is difficult to envisage a large party organization which is exclusively based on 
plebiscitary decision-making (even though the Italian Five Star Movement may come close), but 
we found a surprisingly high number of parties which mix these two decision styles. Over 55 
percent of the parties in our study provide for some plebiscitary decision-making.  
There are several reasons why the two variants of IPD are combined in different way in 
individual party families and countries. For instance, highly inclusive plebiscitary procedures 
might be a substitute for less inclusive assembly-based procedures. Think, for example, of a 
populist party which uses plebiscites to legitimate the policies of its leadership while providing 
little space for genuine internal discussion. Such substitution strategies are not necessarily 
confined to populist parties. A key element of the cartel party argument is the suggestion that 
leaders of established parties may seek to enhance their autonomy by promoting plebiscitary 
modes of decision-making which by-pass middle level elites (Katz and Mair 1995: 21). Yet 
inclusive plebiscitary procedures could also be additive, if parties with a strong tradition of 
assembly-based internal democracy feel compelled to adapt to the pressure of a public discourse 
which regards plebiscitary decision-making as inherently superior to assembly-based modes of 
democracy (Fuchs 2007; Pappi 2015: 224-25; Zittel 2006). In the populist case, we would expect 
a very low AIPD score to go together with a high PIPD value, while in the latter (“pan-
democratic”) case we would expect a positive correlation. Finally, party legislation or 
institutional learning may induce fairly similar patterns of IPD in some countries while the 
absence of such mechanisms may lead to substantial within-country variation.  
Conceptually, our AIPD measure is a formative index (Diamantopoulos et al. 2008; 
Diamantopoulos and Winklhofer 2001) consisting of three logically independent components: 
programme-writing, personnel-selection and organizational structure. Unfortunately, for many of 
our cases we have incomplete information about all three components. However, because testing 
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shows that these components are highly correlated, we have decided to include all cases with 
valid data for at least 2 of our 3 components.16 Our calculations are based on data for the years 
2011 to 2014 using the most recent available measurement point.  
We start by asking whether our conceptual distinction between assembly-based and 
plebiscitary intra-party democracy holds empirically. First, the relatively weak correlation 
coefficient of 0.37 (Pearson) indicates that both indices are related, yet most likely measure 
separate dimensions. This supports our contention that it makes sense to look at both dimensions 
when trying to assess the extent to which parties are internally democratic, because some parties 
are inclusive with one type of procedure, but not with the other. 
 
C. Patterns of Intra-party Democracy: Divergence rather than Uniformity 
When we turn to simple descriptive statistics, we also see substantial differences between 
our two measures. Both indices have a theoretical minimum of 0 and a maximum of 1. The 
results for the assembly-based IPD index show that all but one of the 122 parties included in our 
study have internal structures that offer at least some internal democracy. The exception is the 
one-man Dutch Freedom Party of Geert Wilders which has no party members and hence no 
internal structure to speak of. It has therefore been coded missing for our IPD indices. Our data 
show that the AIPD index, which measures intra-party democracy based on meetings and 
exchange of arguments within party bodies, represents the essential core of intra-party 
democracy. We have a valid measurement for all parties, and none of the parties comes close to 
the minimum possible value of our index (the lowest value is .26) while some parties go all the 
way towards almost perfectly democratic internal procedures (see Appendix A3). Whereas most 
parties cluster in the middle range of the AIPD index, the pattern changes substantially for the 
plebiscitary variant of IPD. More than 40 per cent of the parties in our study have not 
institutionalized any plebiscitary mechanisms, but some parties reach our maximum value of 1.0.  
When we break down our data by country, we clearly find that nation-specific factors 
play an important role, a finding which further weakens the notion of any overarching tendency 
among parties. Table 7 reports the assembly-based and plebiscitary IPD indices, by country. Let 
us first focus on the assembly-based intra-party democracy. There is some spread within 
countries – and this is to be expected – but in 11 of the 19 countries the difference between the 
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highest and lowest AIPD score is not more than 30 points, and in some countries, it is 
considerably less (e.g. Australia, Canada, Czech Republic, Norway, Portugal, and Spain). There 
are greater differences in the general levels of AIPD between countries. Austria, France, Poland, 
Portugal and Spain stand out for having relatively low AIPD values, while Belgium, Germany, 
Ireland, the Netherlands, Norway and the UK are characterized by generally high levels of 
AIPD.  
 
[Table 7ABOUT HERE] 
 
The picture changes entirely when we focus on the plebiscitary variant of IPD. Here we see two 
patterns. There is considerably more spread within countries: in some countries, there is 
complete uniformity because of the absence of plebiscitary practices (Austria, Czech Republic, 
Poland), in 14 countries one or more parties have not introduced any plebiscitary measures, 
while a few of the other countries stand out because most or all parties register fairly high PIPD 
values (Belgium, Canada, Italy, UK). In the latter four countries, it seems reasonable to speculate 
that we are seeing the effect of institutional diffusion. In the remaining countries, parties vary 
widely in the extent to which they have adopted plebiscitary mechanisms. If diffusion pressures 
are strong, we would expect that coming years will bring an upward convergence on the PIPD 
indices, at least in countries where at least one party has already adopted such measures.  
A closer look at the main party families shows clear differences between them in terms of 
IPD usage. They do not, however, always meet the obvious theoretical expectations. For 
instance, while the Greens are associated with calls for democratization of public life, overall 
they have only a mid-range score on our plebiscitary index, although they are the most inclusive 
party family when it comes to assembly-based intra-party politics. The Social Democrats, on the 
other hand, come closest to our pan-democratic model, with comparatively high scores for both 
types of practices (see Table 7). Christian Democrats/Conservatives conform to the conventional 
wisdom in that they register average assembly-based IPD scores and fairly low plebiscitary 
values.  
Surprisingly, the Far Right does not score high on the plebiscitary index even though this 
category encompasses populist right-wing parties.17 Finally, the most notable result is that Left 
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Socialist parties are by far the most reluctant party family when it comes to plebiscitary 
measures. It seems plausible to speculate that this may reflect the influence of traditional left-
wing organizational thinking, with its considerable emphasis on party discipline. Although 
plebiscitary politics have often been linked with political extremism, our evidence suggests that 
parties on the far left or right of the spectrum have been most hesitant to embrace plebiscitary 
measures.  
Finally, when looking at the beta values in Table 7 we see once again the familiar story of 
much stronger effects by country than by ideological family. However, there are considerable 
differences regarding the balance between assembly-based and plebiscitary forms of IPD, which 
reminds us that we should not too readily generalize about one dominant organizational model of 
party organization. 
 
VII. Connecting resources, structur s and linkages 
After presenting this descriptive overview of the main findings of the PPDB Round 1 data, it is 
time to begin examining how our three analytical dimensions relate to one another empirically. 
This is not the place to investigate and test causal hypotheses, but we can at least provide the 
grounds for developing such hypotheses by exploring some basic statistical relationships within 
the data. We do this here by reporting the simple bivariate correlation coefficients for a number 
of indicators that are drawn from across the three dimensions. The key indicators include AIPD 
as a measure of democratic linkage, leadership strength as a measure of organizational structure, 
and three organizational resource measures: membership/electorate ratio, party income/GDP 
ratio, and percentage of party income that comes from state subsidies.  
 
The results reveal a number of interesting relationships across the three dimensions of analysis. 
First, in terms of association between AIPD and the other dimensions, we find that the less 
internally democratic parties are, the more members they have relative to electors, the richer and 
the more dependent on state funding they are, and the stronger their leaders are. The last two of 
these correlations are statistically significant at the 5 percent significance level or better. Second, 
there are also politically noteworthy associations between organizational structure and resources, 
in that the stronger leaders are within their parties, the more members they have as a proportion 
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of the electorate, and the richer and the more dependent on state funding they tend to be; these 
are all statistically significant relationships at the 5 percent level of better. The relevant details 
are reported in Table 8. 
 
[Table 8 about here] 
 
 These correlations point to areas for further investigation. For instance, they suggest 
different categories of parties that might exist. The first is a group of parties that are (in national 
terms) large, rich and heavily dependent on state subsidies; these will also tend to be relatively 
‘top-down’, leader-dominated organizations. By contrast, the second group is the opposite of all 
these things: it consists of parties that are (in their own national contexts) relatively small, poor, 
and not so well supported by the state, but which are more internally democratic and less 
leadership-dominated. Whether we can actually distinguish such clusters of parties is a task for 
future research.  
Our preliminary findings also invite researchers to address some of the major ‘so what?’ 
questions of this field of political science: for instance, what are the consequences of these 
organizational patterns for the legitimacy of party and political systems? If a country has a 
preponderance of large, leader-dominated and state-dependent parties, does this lead to higher 
levels of public dissatisfaction with the parties and/or political systems as a whole? And what of 
the consequences for public policy: are such countries more or less likely to generate policy 
outcomes that represent the views of a majority of electors? Here, we can only raise such 
questions rather than attempt to answer them. However, we suggest that the PPDB data and 
measures not only point the way for politically important lines of future research, but also 
provide some tools that should help researchers who want to tackle these research puzzles.    
 
 
VI. Conclusions 
 
Our analyses of the PPDB data have demonstrated a remarkable coexistence of uniformity and 
diversity. When it comes to some of the main indicators of party organizational capacity such as 
party members, staff and finance, all evidence points in the direction of continuing trends that 
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have been diagnosed for many years. Comparisons with previous studies clearly show that in 
most cases party membership has continued to decline, while financial resources and paid labour 
have continued to grow. Yet, substantial differences persist between party families and, more 
importantly, between countries.  
On the other hand, we find truly remarkable uniformity regarding the core architecture of 
party organizations. Despite the enormous attention some groups of new parties have attracted in 
the media and in scholarly literature, the evidence is clear: if they survive, they adapt their 
organizational skeleton to a common template. Virtually all have regular party conferences 
which function as supreme ‘law making’ intra-party bodies; they normally have one (some two) 
party leaders with clearly defined powers, and they tend to have a supreme executive body.  This 
convergence occurs even where laws do not require it, suggesting that in these countries this 
organizational style has become a normative imperative or a functional necessity – or both. 
This image of overwhelming uniformity changes again when we look more closely at 
how these member-associations operate, creating indices to measure their openness in regards to 
assembly-based and plebiscitary democracy. Here, we find substantial variation between 
countries and party families. While assembly-based IPD is the standard model of intra-party 
decision-making, at greater or lesser degrees of inclusiveness, the provisions for plebiscitary IPD 
vary substantially. They are simply non-existent in a considerable number of parties, and in some 
countries altogether. Overall, we see rather wide variation in how parties combine these different 
types of practices, and in the extent to which they have expanded the locus of decision-making.  
In sum, one clear message from this preliminary examination of the first round PPDB 
data is that there is still a lot of mileage in closer examination of the details of party organization. 
Uniformity, which is all too often in the limelight, is clearly only part of the story. While 
scholars have a tendency to look for organizational trends, individual parties often seek to gain 
electoral advantage through organizational innovation. Thus, while party organizations across 
modern democracies have much in common now, there is more diversity, particularly between 
countries, than many classics of the party literature imply. If parties and their popular 
organizations can play crucial roles in integrating citizens and their political demands into the 
political process, as much literature on representative democracy asserts, then these 
organizational differences deserve continued scrutiny, because they can have important political 
consequences.  
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APPENDICES 
Appendix 1: PPDB Round 1 Country Teams 
(Coordinators listed in boldface type) 
 
Australia  Anika Gauja 
Austria  Wolfgang C. Müller, Manès Weisskircher 
Belgium  Kris Deschouwer, Emilie van Haute 
Canada  William Cross, Scott Pruysers 
Czech Republic    Petr Kopecký 
Denmark  Karina Kosiara-Pedersen 
France  Elodie Fabre 
Germany  Thomas Poguntke, Sophie Karow, Jan Kette  
Hungary  Zsolt Eneydi 
Ireland  David M. Farrell, Connor Little 
Israel   Gideon Rahat, Alona Dolinsky 
Italy   Luciano Bardi, Enrico Calossi, Eugenio Pizzimenti 
Netherlands  Ruud Koole, Marijn Nagtzaam 
Norway  Elin Allern 
Poland  Aleks Szczerbiak, Anna Mikulska 
Portugal  Marina Costa-Lobo, Isabella Razuolli 
Spain                Tània Verge  
Sweden             Nicholas Aylott, Niklas Bolin 
United Kingdom    Paul Webb, Annika Hennl, Dan Keith 
 
 
Database Editor Susan Scarrow 
Data Manager Benjamin Danforth 
Project Directors Thomas Poguntke, Susan Scarrow, Paul Webb 
 
Advisory Board: Ingrid van Biezen, Kenneth Janda, Richard Katz, Miki Caul Kittilson 
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Appendix 2: Index of leadership strength 
 
Index Frequency Percent 
1.0 4 4.9 
2.0 7 8.6 
3.0 34 42.0 
4.0 15 18.5 
5.0 11 13.6 
6.0 6 7.4 
7.0 4 4.9 
 Sum 81 100.0 
 
Note: This is a composite index constructed by adding together the total number of leadership rights from the 
following items: Leader may help select deputy leader (21%); may summon party officials (31.6%); may summon 
party congress (22.1%); may attend party executive (93.6%); may attend party congress (91.6%); may appoint at 
least 1 member of party executive (7.2%); must consent to coalition agreements (5.3%); is designated party’s 
‘external representative’ (41.1%); is expressely accountable to party congress (27.4%). Each ‘right’ is coded 1; 
where the leader does not have a right, it is coded 0. Note that where a leader is not statutorily accountable to party 
congress it is coded 1. The index has a theoretical range running from 0-9, although empirically it only runs from 1 
to 7. 
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Appendix 3: The Intra-Party Democracy Indices 
a) Assembly-based intra party democracy (AIPD)  
Our AIPD index is based on relevant PPDB variables which were recoded according to their 
bearing on the inclusiveness of intra-party decision-making. As a rule, we coded variable items 
as 0.00 or 0.25 if they indicate that a given party has no or a modest level of inclusiveness on this 
specific aspect of IPD; 0.50 was allocated for a medium level and 0.75 and 1.00 for high levels 
of inclusiveness. In some cases this involved ranking party arenas first according to their 
inclusiveness. Table A1 illustrates the logic: A party where the party congress has a final vote on 
the manifesto has the highest score on this particular aspect while a party where the leader has 
the final word is considered to be least inclusive.  
 
Table A1: Example of coding PPDB variables 
PPDB-Question: Who has the final vote on the manifesto? 
PPDB-answer-option AIPD-Value Effect on AIPD 
Party Congress 1.00 (max IPD; most ‘inclusive‘) 
high inclusiveness 
Party Sub-Units 0.75 
Party Legislators 0.50 medium inclusivness 
Executive Committee 0.25 
low inclusivenes 
Party Leader 0.00 (min IPD; least ‘inclusive‘) 
 
The AIPD index is made up of three components for which we have a different number of 
variables. In order to weigh them equally, we have first calculated a score for each component; 
the final AIPD index value is then the arithmetic mean of the three components. Table A2 shows 
all items that have been used. As it is impossible to document all coding rules in this appendix, 
please refer to the PPDB website for a detailed documentation.  
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Table A2: Composition of Assembly-based IPD index (AIPD) 
IP
D
- 
C
o
m
p
o
n
en
t 
Decision-Making: 
Programme 
Decision-Making: 
Personnel 
Organizational  
Structure 
IP
D
-V
a
ri
a
b
le
s 
(P
P
D
B
-i
te
m
s)
 
Who has the final vote on the 
manifesto?   
(1a) Are rules for the 
selection of the party 
leader existent?  
ARITMETHIC  
MEAN  
of all “party leader 
variables” 
Who is eligible to vote at the party 
congress? 
 (1b) Who has the final 
vote in the party leader 
selection process?  
How frequently must a party congress be 
held? 
 (1c) Was there a vote at 
the most inclusive stage of 
the party leader selection 
process? 
Who has ex officio seats with full voting 
rights in the party’s highest executive 
body? 
 (1d) Who was eligible to 
participate in this vote 
(referring to previous 
question)?
 
 
Prerogatives and accountability of the 
party leader? 
 (2) Who has the final vote in the candidate selection 
process?   
 
IP
D
-s
co
re
 
C
o
m
p
o
n
en
t 
Variable-Score 
 = Component-Score 
ARITMETHIC MEAN 
of (1) “party leader selection variables” and  
(2) “candidate selection variable” 
ARITMETHIC MEAN 
of all “organizational structure variables” 
 
IP
D
-
sc
o
re
 
F
in
a
l 
ARITMETHIC MEAN 
of the components “DM: programme”, “DM: personnel” and “organizational structure” 
Note: 1b and d partially overlap. We have decided to keep both variables to improve precision. 
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b) Plebiscitary intra-party democracy 
For the calculation of the PIPD index we have two variables tapping into decision-making on 
manifestoes and policy issues and two variables on personal selection (Table A3). As they are all 
dichotomous, the final index value is simply the arithmetic mean of all variables available.  
 
 
Table A3: Composition of Plebiscitary IPD-Index (PIPD) 
IPD-Component 
IPD-Variables  
(PPDB-items) 
Decision-Making:  
Programme and issues 
Do all party members have a vote on the manifesto?  
Are there intra-party policy ballots in which all party members decide on policy issues? 
Decision-Making:  
Personnel 
Do all party members have a vote in the party leader selection process? 
Do all party members have the final vote in the candidate selection process? 
Organizational Structure --- no items/variables --- 
IPD-PD-Scale Score 
ARITMETHIC MEAN 
of all variables 
 
Notes 
                                                 
1
  We are grateful to all funders, especially our national funding bodies  and our universities who have 
supported primary research, travel and meetings for all project members. This work has been supported by an Open 
Research Area (ORA) project grant funded by Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft PO 370/11-1, Economic and 
Social Research Council (UK) ES/L016613/1, and National Science Foundation (USA) 106498.  A full listing of 
funders to date is included on the PPDB website, (http://www.politicalpartydb.org). We also gratefully acknowledge 
the helpful comments received by two anonymous reviewers. Of course, the usual disclaimer applies. 
2 
 Those using PPDB Round 1 data should reference this article for a full introduction to the data set and to 
acknowledge those who contributed to it. The data is available for from the project website as of 1 January 2017,  
www.politicalpartydb.org 
3 
 We consciously violated this rule in a few  places, for instance when we ask team members to not only give 
the official rules for candidate selection, but to also give an expert opinion about which levels of the party had the 
most influence in the most recent round of candidate selections. In these places, those who distrust the judgment of a 
single expert can ignore these variables and rely solely on the official stories.
 
4
  The countries are: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Germany, 
Hungary, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and UK.  For a full list of 
parties covered in Round 1, see web site. 
5
  This is not to overlook the obvious fact that party members might also be considered a form of linkage 
between parties and society, but here they will be examined from the perspective of organizational resources. 
6
  We assigned parties to party families following this rubric: according to membership in various 
transnational party organizations, if available.  If not, we asked our country team leaders to code into one of seven 
categories, or “other”.  Because parties themselves showed most movement over time between the “far right” and 
“radical populist” labels, we combined these parties for purposes of this article. 
7
  Multiple Classification Analysis is an additive modelling technique which is appropriate for interval-level 
dependent variables and nominal-level independent variables, as is the case here. The beta coefficients express the 
explained variance in the dependent variable as a proportion of the total variance, while controlling for the effects of 
other independent variables. More precisely, the explained variance is taken to be that which is accounted for by the 
categories of the independent variables. This is ‘between groups’ variance (in our case, the variance explained by 
membership of either country or party family groups), while any other unexplained variance is ‘within-groups’ 
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variance. The rank-order of the betas tells us the relative importance of the predictors in a model. The beta 
coefficients’ significance levels are based on the F-ratio statistic (Retherford and Choe 1993).  
8
  In addition, our results may be distorted somewhat that it includes data on election years for 7 of our 19 
countries.  
9 
 The parties have been categorized on the basis of their membership in supranational party bodies and expert 
judgments. Details can be obtained from the authors. 
10 
 Unfortunately, there are rather fewer cases for which we have both central and legislative party staffing 
data – only approximately one-third of the total number of parties, which we feel is too few from which to gain a 
clear picture, so we do not report those figures here. 
11
 This also appears true of Germany, but we have head office staffing data for only one German party, so cannot be 
sure if this is representative. 
12   The extraordinary number of staff employed by parliamentary parties in Germany owes something to the 
difficulty of attracting state funding beyond a fixed ‘absolute ceiling’ which limits the overall sum of money that can 
go from the state to political parties. This ceiling did not change for many years until the Bundestag introduced 
indexation in 2013. The way around this for the parties was to increase the number of their parliamentary staff, all of 
whom are paid for by the state. According to German legal doctrine, their work pertains to the sphere of the state 
rather than the parties, since formally the parliamentary parties are not supposed to do things that directly benefit the 
extra-parliamentary party. The reality, however, is that these personnel split their time between working for MPs as 
personal assistants and working for the parliamentary (and sometimes extra-parliamentary) parties. In this way they 
clearly constitute a resource of the party, then; however, it does render the German situation somewhat unique, so 
readers may prefer to exclude the German figures when reflecting on the overall averages for parliamentary party 
staff. 
13 
 Perhaps unexpectedly, there are no large differences between party families in terms of the leader’s 
accountability to the party conference. Green parties were slightly more likely to specify this, but all party families 
were in the range from 25-37 percent. 
14
  Our indices include only rights for full members, and do not take account of whether similar rights are 
offered to registered supporters or other kinds of party affiliates. Thus, the indices do not rate parties more highly if 
they open participation to non-members. Our theoretical justification is that including open procedures strains the 
theoretical notion of “intra” party democracy, which is our primary interest here. Within the current PPDB universe, 
these situations are empirically rare, though some have been high profile cases, such as the UK Labour Party 
election in 2015 which allowed participation by ‘registered supporters’ who were not full members. 
15  The indices used in this section are based on von dem Berge and Poguntke 2017. Other members of the 
PPDB team have constructed different indices of IPD for other articles. We do not suggest that this coding scheme is 
the only way to analyse differences in intra-party governance, but we think it is plausible one. Different coding 
schemes would affect the details of relationships reported in the following sections, but probably would not change 
their major conclusions. 
16  
The situation is different for the plebiscitary index which includes only two components. Here we have 
simply used all available data.  
17
  To a degree, this may be due to the fact that we have combined two party groups which analytically belong 
to separate categories, namely extreme right and populist right-wing parties. We have chosen to do so because this 
distinction, even though theoretically meaningful, is frequently empirically fuzzy as many parties meander between 
extreme right-wing and more ‘acceptable’ right-wing populist appeals. If we look at the two groups separately, we 
can see that populists record higher PIPD values (.32 and .14). However, they are still not conspicuously high and 
we must read these results with some care is fairly low. 
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Table 1: Organizational Dimensions and Sample Variables 
 
Dimensions Sample Variables 
Structures  
Leadership Autonomy-Restriction Rules for leadership selection and re-selection. Rules for 
policy-making. Staff resources of individual legislators 
and leaders. 
Centralization-Localization Rules for candidate selection. Distribution of financial 
resources across levels. 
Coordination-Entropy Formal recognition of factions. Representation of regional 
parties in national party executive. Representation of 
legislative party in national party executive. Openness to 
candidates who are not party members.  
Territorial Concentration-Dispersion Number of basic organizational units. Self-identification 
as regional party. 
Resources  
Financial Strength-Weakness Party revenue. Party campaign spending 
Resource Diversification-
Concentration 
Proportion of party funding from public, party, and private 
sources.  
State Autonomy-Dependence Proportion of party funding from public sources. 
Bureaucratic Strength-Weakness Number of professional staff in extra-parliamentary 
organization and for parliamentary party.  
Volunteer Strength-Weakness Membership numbers. Use of web page to mobilize 
volunteer help. 
Representative Strategies  
Individual Linkage: Integrated 
Identity – Consumer Choice 
Membership rules (dues rates, probationary periods, ease 
of joining). Roles for individuals (members or non-
members) in party decisions.  
Group Linkage: Non-Party Group 
Ownership – Autonomy 
  
Statutory roles for group or sub-group representatives at 
party conferences and on party executive. Actual 
representation of sub-group members in party executive. 
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Table 2: National party income, by country and party family 
Country/ 
Party family 
Mean income of 
national party 
head offices 
Mean party 
income per billion 
euros of GDP 
Party income per 
registered voter 
Percentage of 
party income 
from direct 
public subsidies 
COUNTRY     
Australia  17,510,742 (4) 15,757 (4) 1.19 (4) - 
Austria  12,521,560 (5) 40,165 (5) 1.96 (5) 79.88 (5) 
Belgium  6,919,590 (12) 17,687 (12) 0.86 (12) 75.41 (12) 
Canada  15,152,621 (5) 11,200 (5) 0.62 (5) 34.20 (5) 
Czech Republic   8,016,845 (5) 50,390 (5) 0.95 (5) 48.14 (5) 
Denmark  3,501,990 (8) 13,934 (8) 0.86 (8) 44.13 (8) 
France  60,888,527 (2) 28,987 (2) 1.41 (2) 43.90 (2) 
Germany  60,701,745 (7) 21,764 (7) 0.98 (7) 35.35 (7) 
Hungary  2,378,244 (4) 23,844 (4) 0.29 (4) 81.63 (4) 
Ireland  3,178,000 (4) 18,065 (4) 0.99 (4) 68.50 (4) 
Israel  2,494,406 (10) 11,986 (10) 0.44 (10) 81.24 (10) 
Italy  28,827,778 (5) 17,739 (5) 0.61 (5) 53.75 (4) 
Netherlands  4,508,672 (10) 6,997 (10) 0.36 (10) 36.26 (10) 
Norway  10,072,069 (7) 26,812 (7) 2.77 (7) 69.16 (7) 
Poland  5,324,045 (5) 13,566 (5) 0.17 (5) 54.90 (5) 
Portugal  7,102,583 (6) 41,164 (6) 0.37 (6) 74.17 (6) 
Spain  45,787,541 (5) 43,220 (5) 1.28 (5) 67.85 (5) 
Sweden  10,378,283 (7) 24,526 (7) 1.42 (7) 71.29 (7) 
UK  12,716,844 (7) 6,262 (7) 0.28 (7) 8.76 (7) 
PARTY FAMILY     
Christian Dem/Cons. 21,386,021 (30) 29,083 (30) 1.13 (30) 55.9 (28) 
Social Democrats  25,570,184 (24) 34,076 (24) 1.49 (24) 51.4 (23) 
Liberals  8,108,648 (21) 12,673 (21) 0.65 (21) 47.2 (20) 
Greens  5.738,709 (13) 8,653 (13) 0.42 (13) 54.8 (12) 
Left Socialists 6,883,071 (11) 16,183 (11) 0.49 (11) 60.4 (11) 
Far Right  7,188,960 (12) 17,060 (12) 0.81 (12) 77.9 (12) 
Overall mean  14,177,811 (118) 21,069 (118) 0.94 (111) 57.50 (113) 
Beta (Country) .702*** .569** .663*** .745*** 
Beta (Party family) .309*** .445*** .416*** .253* 
Model R2 .593*** .491 .572*** .643*** 
 
Note: All amounts are expressed in Euros (using historical exchange rates as quoted for December each year in 
http://www.oanda.com/currency/historical-rates/). The Beta and Model R2 statistics are from Multiple Classification 
Analyses, with country and party family as the independent variables. *** = p<.01, ** = p<.05, * = p<.10. Figures in 
parenthesis refer to the number of parties. Note that subsidy data for the Australian parties are missing; it is known in 
general terms that Australian federal parties are only reimbursed for certain election expenses by the state, but we do 
not have any Australian data from a general election year, and are thus obliged to treat the country as missing for this 
variable. 
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Table 3: Number of full-time party staff, by country and party family 
Country 
Mean number of 
full-time paid 
staff in head 
office  
Mean number of 
head office staff  
per 1000 party 
members  
Mean number of 
full-time paid staff 
in legislative party  
Mean number of 
legislative staff 
per MP  
COUNTRY     
Australia  20.8 (3) 0.4 (3) - - 
Belgium  30.5 (10) 1.2 (10) 11.9 (8) 1.0 (8) 
Czech Republic  28.3 (4) 1.7 (4) 2.8 (4) 0.1 (3) 
Denmark  9.0 (4) 0.8 (4) 23.3 (4) 1.6 (4) 
Germany  77.0 (1) 1.2 (1) 726.8 (6) 7.0 (6) 
Hungary  12.0 (1) 15.0 (1) 57.8 (4) 1.1 (4) 
Ireland  27.0 (3) 1.5 (2) 32.1 (5) 1.9 (4) 
Israel  12.5 (2) 0.2 (1) 24.3 (3) 4.5 (2) 
Italy  64.0 (4) 0.1 (4) - - 
Netherlands  44.5 (2) 1.2 (2) - - 
Norway  19.4 (7) 1.0 (6) 24.5 (7) 1.7 (6) 
Portugal  1.0 (1) 0.2 (1) 38.0 (6) 2.3 (6) 
Spain  105.6 (5) 0.9 (5) 37.7 (5) 0.8 (5) 
Sweden 35.8 (8) 1.2 (8) 37.3 (6) 1.1 (6) 
UK 93.1 (7) 1.2 (7) 3.2 (5) 1.2 (5) 
PARTY FAMILY     
Christian Dem/Cons. 56.9 (15) 1.0 (15) 161.7 (14) 1.9 (13) 
Social Democrats 80.3 (13) 0.8 (13) 111.6 (12) 2.0 (12) 
Liberals 31.6 (12) 0.1 (12) 65.9 (12) 1.8 (12) 
Greens 11.6 (10) 2.6 (9) 62.9 (9) 2.9 (8) 
Left Socialists 34.1 (4) 1.3 (4) 89.5 (8) 2.7 (8) 
Far Right 18.1 (6) 1.0 (6) 23.2 (6) 0.8 (6) 
Overall mean  49.2 (60) 1.3 (59) 95.3 (61) 2.0 (59) 
Beta (Country) .541 .940*** .863*** .897*** 
Beta (Party family) .465 .084 .137 .244*** 
Model R2 .448 .914*** .766 .854*** 
 
Note: The Beta and Model R2 statistics are from Multiple Classification Analyses, with country and party family as 
the independent variables. *** = p<.01, ** = p<.05, * = p<.10. Figures in parenthesis refer to the number of parties. 
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Table 4: Mean party membership, by country and party family 
Country 
 
 
  Mean Party 
membership 
Mean party 
membership  as  
% of national 
electorate (ME) 
 
Total national 
party 
membership 
Total national 
membership as % of  
national electorate 
(ME) 
COUNTRY       
Australia (2013)  61,425 (4) 0.42 (4)    245,700         1.67 
Austria (2011)  170,704 (5) 2.67 (5)    853,520       13.35 
Belgium (2012)  34,542 (11) 0.43 (11)    379,962         4.73 
Canada (2011)  50,250 (4) 0.21 (4)    201,000         0.84 
Czech Republic (2011±)  29,482 (5) 0.35 (5)    147,410        1.75 
Denmark (2011)  18,706 (8) 0.46 (8)    149,648        3.68 
France (2012)  226,743 (2) 0.52 (2)    453,486        1.04 
Germany (2012)  217,101 (6) 0.35 (6) 1,302,606        2.10 
Hungary (2011)  21,530 (4) 0.26 (4)      86,120        1.04 
Ireland (2013)  17,413 (4) 0.54 (4)      69,652        2.16 
Israel (2011±)  59,534 (5) 1.05 (5)    351,668        6.21  
Italy (2011±)  421,205 (5) 0.90 (5) 2,106,025        4.50 
Netherlands (2013)  30,586 (10) 0.24 (10)    305,860        2.40 
Norway (2012)  24,237 (6) 0.67 (6)    145,422        4.02 
Poland (2013±)  40,257 (6) 0.13 (6)    241,542        0.75 
Portugal (2011±)  47,638 (6) 0.50 (6)    285,828        2.98 
Spain (2011±)  298,800 (5) 0.84 (5) 1,494,000        4.30 
Sweden (2011±)  31,579 (8) 0.43 (8)    252,632        3.44 
UK (2014)  63,735 (7) 0.14 (7)    446,145        0.98 
PARTY FAMILY      
Christian Dem/Cons.   158,094 (29) 0.91 (29)         -          - 
Social Democrats   130,727 (24) 0.75 (24)         -          - 
Liberals   35,634 (21) 0.35 (21)           -          - 
Greens   14,141 (13) 0.11 (13)         -          - 
Left Socialists  30,353 (10) 0.28 (10)            -          - 
Far Right  36,171 (14) 0.36 (14)         -          - 
Overall mean
 
Beta (Country) 
Beta (Party family) 
Model R2
 
 
 
 
       85,263 (111) 
        .631*** 
        .353*** 
        .529*** 
0.54 (110) 
.557*** 
.348*** 
.376*** 
 446,164 (19)         3.13 (19)  
Note: ± Indicates that year is approximate because data come from various years (eg, data for some parties in a given 
country are for 2011, while for others they might be for 2010 or 2012). Note that the national membership total and ME 
ratio for France are only based on two parties, and so are certainly underestimates of the true figures. The total national 
membership for Israel is based on data for 6 parties, but the MCA is only able to include data for 5 Israeli parties since it 
was not possible to ascribe a meaningful party family to the National Religious Party. 
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Table 5: Leadership strength, by country and party family 
Country/ 
Party family 
Leadership 
strength 
COUNTRY  
Australia  2.25 (4) 
Belgium  4.44 (9) 
Canada  4.80 (5) 
Czech Republic   3.00 (5) 
Denmark  3.00 (8) 
Germany  2.50 (6) 
Hungary  4.50 (4) 
Ireland  3.50 (4) 
Italy  7.00 (1) 
Netherlands  2.50 (2) 
Norway  3.50 (6) 
Portugal  5.00 (5) 
Spain  5.40 (5) 
Sweden  3.13 (8) 
UK  3.29 (7) 
PARTY FAMILY  
Christian Dem/Cons. 3.95 (21) 
Social Democrats  3.95 (19) 
Liberals          3.63 (16) 
Greens  3.13 (8) 
Left Socialists 2.78 (9) 
Far Right  4.33 (6) 
Overall mean  3.70 (79) 
Beta (Country) .722*** 
Beta (Party family) .346* 
Model R2 .608 
 
Note: *** = p<.01, ** = p<.05, * = p<.10. Figures in parenthesis refer to the number of parties.  
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Table 6: Leadership strength and other party organs, bivariate relationships 
 
 Correlation N 
Executive size  .245** 78 
Congress frequency .257** 74 
Number of party members .294*** 80 
% of seats in national legislature .215* 81 
 
Note: *** = p<.01, ** = p<.05, * = p<.10. N refers to the number of parties.  
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Table 7: Assembly-based IPD, by country and party family 
Country/ 
Party family AIPD 
AIPD 
 Range 
 
PIPD 
PIPD 
Range 
COUNTRY     
Australia  0.64 (4) .1 0.38 (4) .67 
Austria 0.46 (5) .4 0.00 (5) --- 
Belgium  0.71 (12) .39 0.60 (12) .75 
Canada  0.68 (5) .07 0.57 (5) .34 
Czech Republic   0.64 (5) .1 0.00 (3) --- 
Denmark  0.57 (8) .48 0.15 (8) .5 
France 0.40 (2) .19 0.50 (2) --- 
Germany  0.73 (6) .3 0.21 (6) .5 
Hungary  0.68 (4) .27 0.06 (4)  .25 
Ireland  0.72 (5) .32 0.13 (5) .67 
Israel 0.62 (6) .5 0.42 (6) 1.0 
Italy  0.49 (5) .45 0.67 (5) .67 
Netherlands  0.78 (9) .41 0.44 (9) 1.0 
Norway  0.76 (6) .05 0.21 (6) .5 
Poland 0.48 (6) .17 0.00 (5) --- 
Portugal  0.44 (6) .11 0.25 (6) .5 
Spain  0.39 (5) .08 0.07 (5) .33 
Sweden  0.62 (8) .25 0.09 (8) .25 
UK  0.78 (7) .33 0.63 (7) .42 
PARTY FAMILY     
Christian Dem/Cons. 0.59 (30) .58 0.26 (28) 1.0 
Social Democrats  0.67 (24) .62 0.45 (24) 1.0 
Liberals          0.63 (21)             .58         0.35 (21)              1.0 
Greens  0.73 (14) .73 0.32 (14) .75 
Left Socialists 0.60 (11) .47 0.12 (11) .50 
Far Right  0.55 (14) .62 0.22 (13) 1.0 
Overall mean  0.63 (114)  0.31 (111)  
Beta (Country) .700***  .692***  
Beta (Party family) .256**  .213  
Model R2 .589***  .561**  
 
Note: *** = p<.01, ** = p<.05, * = p<.10. Figures in parenthesis refer to the number of parties. 
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Table 8:  Correlations across dimensions 
 
 
Note: *** = p<.01, ** = p<.05, * = p<.10. Figures in parenthesis = number of parties. 
 
 
 
 AIPD Leadership Strength 
Leadership Strength -.254 (81) ** 
 
 
% Party Income from State -.272 (113) *** 
 
.375 (76) *** 
 
Party Income/GDP -.117 (118) 
 
.237 (80) ** 
 
Membership/electorate ratio -.151 (114) .223 (80) ** 
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